


Discussion: Issues 06/15/01

Today's New York Times Quotes Wolfowitz are referring to our posture of Deterrence – Assurance – Dissuasion – Defenses (DADD)

Nacht

- Proliferation of:
 - Types of threats
 - Those threatening us
- Need to disaggregate threats into those that fit into DAD (Deterrence - Assurance – Dissuasion)
- Suppose there are threats we could posit where nuclear weapons are irrelevant – should we dismiss this threat?
 - Have a whole range of threats to deter, and the one we have learned to do best is the Soviet Union
 - Ranges to subnational terrorist groups
 - Start with what we know, nation states and then get to terrorists
 - There are a set of threats that can be deterred with nuclear weapons
 - There are others that are deterred with conventional
 - Others that are not deterrable
 - Look at spectrum and see what is not covered by the deterrence posture and current methods and examine what we can do with these
 - Are there things we can add to our toolbox to address these?
 - To what extent will lesser priority items fall off the table once we address Russia with a robust deterrent
- Need to examine actual cases of deterrence of use
 - Look at Israel dissuasion of use of nuclear weapons by the US during the Gulf War
- ~~Three~~ Four dimensional matrix
 - Weapons: Means of deterrence (tools,)
 - Actors
 - Actions: Type of Conduct
 - Context: Consider circumstances and conduct



- Time dimension is key
 - What would trigger nuclear response?
 - IO
 - Need to overwhelm conventional with tactical nukes
 - Need to understand how the threats are perceived
- Have defined “use” of nuclear weapons too narrowly?
 - Even in Gulf War nuclear weapons were an influence for both our allies and adversaries
- Are we concerned only with the use of weapons or with our entire nuclear posture
 - impact on deterrence, and dissuasion
- We are talking about more than just deterrence
- Full spectrum deterrence?
- US has the most to lose in a nuclear proliferated world

- Nuclear weapons are an equalizer
- Need to maintain an NP regime
- Could nuclear weapons actually be used on the battlefield?
- Do our nuclear declared policy/doctrine/posture and behavior match and is this an issue?
 - US dependence and possible use of nuclear weapons will not necessarily contribute to proliferation
 - A strong nuclear capability will prevent proliferation
- Proliferation may be a reality and we may need to learn how to live with it
- Those signing the NPT had two different goals
 - Abolition of NW
 - Controlling proliferation
- Policy is used both to manage/reduce the threats as well as beef up the weapons systems
- Debate today is between PGM/conventional community and defenses community and not just the traditional nuclear debate (Wahlstetter *)
 - Would we in actuality be self-deterred in the use of nuclear weapons in response to a smaller country (e.g. response to N. Korean nuclear program)
 - Are these types of threats deterrable? Has our political will changed? Do we understand our own psychology?
 - Would new weapons types change the way we would respond, capable beyond “mass kill”, massive retaliation to a more targeted, proportional response
 - “Useable nukes”
 - Alternative uses of nuclear weapons, short of massive kill, is not being explored (prohibited by Congress)
 - Brook ammendment prohibited the development of new nuclear weapons
 - No president has ever played in a war game where nukes are used
 - Is this new? What has changed?
 - Need to consider range of possibilities and options available to ourselves and our adversaries
 - Most people believe that those outside the US believe we would not use nuclear weapons in response to a threat
- Threat definition – will one of these be done? Michael to choose one of these and people send him recommendations
 - Case
 - Spectrum
 - Matrix
- Fundamental reordering of the world security order
 - Transforming events
 - E.g. past: Fall of the Soviet Union and German reunification or possible Korean unification or a NW accident

Sloss

Framework Paper - *Leon will draft a paper and circulate for comment*

- Broad objectives of US security policy
 - Protecting and promoting widespread interests
 - Stability – Security relationship
- The US role in the world
 - Options
 - Deterrence – who, what, how
 - Extended deterrence
- The triad: Deterrence – Dissuasion – Assurance - *Defense*
- The tool box to support the triad
 - Non-nuclear weapons
 - Nuclear weapons
 - Defenses
 - Diplomacy (will)

Issue 1

What is the appropriate security relationship with China? – *bring together a group of China experts (Brad Roberts) and people who look at deterrence more broadly and discuss/educate one another*

- China's goals, objectives, status, *expected evolution/future state*
- *China's internal politics*
- Balancing engagement and deterrence – *need to state how this can be done*
- The role of military force and diplomacy *US forces in the region*
- The role of nuclear weapons – *impact of nuclear forces/weapons in region*
- The role of defenses
- The US and deterrence
- *Taiwan*
- *Regional relationship*

Issue 2

Nuclear force modernization – the policy perspective (*factors influencing*)

- To strengthen deterrence – what are the gaps
- To attack specific, hard to get targets if deterrence fails
- A role in defense
- To keep the nuclear infrastructure alive and well
- To make use more likely, strengthen credibility

Issue 3

The US security relationship with Russia

- What is the role of the overall nuclear posture
- Role of defenses (accident)
- A new approach to arms control (relationship to multilateral arms control)
- Other security issues with Russia – loose nukes
- *Role of assurance and active cooperative threat reduction*
- *View of the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear adequacy (size of stockpile)*

Issue 4

How should the US deal with diverse and uncertain threats from other states of concern?
Where does Japan fit in?

- Planning in the face of uncertainty

- How much, what kind of flexibility
- Is there a role for nuclear weapons? Role for defenses?
- *Role in deterring US?*
- *Consequences for us on the nuclear weapons use by other parties*
- *Role of nuclear weapons in deterring other WMD*
- *Role of counterforces*

Issue 5

The impact on deterrence/dissuasion/assurance/defense of early 21st century trends

- Demographics
- Technology
- Reaction to US superpower status
- Changing offense-defense relationship
- *International organizations vs bilateral initiatives*

Issue 6 – (add to Issue 5 and the framework?)

What is the shape of the world and the security architecture?

- *Proliferation and the non-proliferation regime*
- *Relationship of/with alliances (NATO, EU, NPT, UN)*
- *Japan?*

Other topics for inclusion:

- *Identify coalitions of willing people to address Issues*
- *Russian and Chinese modernization are part of the threat*
- *Response/Reaction of the rest of the world to US actions*
- *Credibility continuum (address in the framework paper)*
- *Holistic view of defenses, balance*
 - *NMD, Homeland*
 - *Relationship with India as an anti-China, anti-Islamic ally to the US*

Barker

- What deterrence mission can be given to non-nuclear weapons, including information warfare? – *and at what cost?*
- Are additional nuclear capabilities possible/*advisable* that would address deterrent shortcomings (*submaximality*) – *and at what cost*
 - Yield options
 - *Do we understand affects*
 - Enhanced lethality (quantify) – *accuracy and affects*
 - Reduced collateral damage (quantify)
 - Unique targets (e.g. BW, EMP, vulnerability, HDBT, BMD)
 - Are nuclear tests necessary
 - *Mobiles*
 - *Countermeasures*
 - *Are there sufficient resources to implement these?*
- *Are current delivery systems sufficiently diverse and capable for necessary missions?*
 - *Cruise missiles*
 - *Countermeasures to sea and space based*
- Reconstitution is important to dissuasion. What are acceptable time limits for production of new capabilities – *combine with point below*
- DoD and DOE infrastructure (people, laboratories, and facilities) must maintain current deterrent and be prepared for surprises and future demands. How should infrastructure be sized? – *combine with point above*
- Credibility of deterrent (nuclear and conventional) is enhanced by operational planning and testing, demonstration, training. What are fiscal and political costs?
- Extended deterrence benefits from forward deployments and shared/interoperable capability. Forward deployment poses vulnerabilities. What are the trade-offs?
- *Missile* defense will contribute to deterrence, dissuasion, assurance. Does it affect number and kinds of *US* conventional and nuclear force structure?
- *Can* subnational threats ~~must~~ be deterred? What policies, capabilities must be developed to deter non-state actors?
- Superb ISR invites low CEP systems (conventional and nuclear) but is potentially vulnerable to countermeasures and disruption. What is the trade-off? – *combine with point below*
- What should be the role of GPS/*INS* and *precision guidance and control*, given vulnerabilities, in systems important to deterrence? – *combine with point above*
- *How do we handle attribution?*
 - *Superb, real time, accurate, active intelligence is needed.*
 - *Role of passive defenses, e.g. inoculation (CW, BW)*
 - *Nuclear weapon safety and security*
 - *Dealerting*
 - *Response to technologic surprise/breakout (both intel and infrastructure)*
 - *Transforming events in technology*

Next Steps

- Policy framework paper (Leon)
- Matrix: Weapons, Actors, Actions, Context (Pief's suggestion)
- China Issues meetings (Leon in DC)
- Shift from developing questions to postulating answers
 - Range of possible options/answers/solutions to questions
- Technical details and basis for other weapons

- Offense-defense
 - Gap in capability and possibilities
- Nuclear-conventional